Musketeer: Incentive-Compatible Rebalancing for Payment Channel Networks

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A Challenge in Blockchain: Scalability








7 tx/s

15 tx/s

65.000 tx/s


A Solution: Payment Channels



On-Chain Method


Payment Channels

Payment Channel Networks (PCNs)




- Payments are possible along multiple channels
- Security through HTLCs
- Intermediaries ask for service fees

Rebalancing PCNs




- Channels can be depleted
- Solving it either with on-chain top-up or

Rebalancing PCNs



- Channels can be depleted
- Solving it either with on-chain top-up or
- Off-chain top-ups using rebalancing

Rebalancing PCNs



- Users might have different rebalancing request!
- Obtain a directed (sub)graph with edge capacities:

Rebalancing = circulations = flows with zero net-flow through each vertex

State of The Art

- Local peer-to-peer search for a cycle
- Revive (CCS'17), globally coordinated mechanism
- **Hide&Seek** (FC'22), privacy-concerning mechanism

These approaches only include parties that wish to rebalance!

So, many channels that may route transactions for low fees are neglected: limited liquidity

Paper's Contribution

Incentivize all PCN users, to maximize liquidity and throughput

 Users can participate as buyers (paying fees to rebalance) or sellers (charging fees to route transactions)

- Users submit their liquidity and bid for every one of their channels
 - Liquidity: coins they are willing to use for routing/rebalancing
 - Bid: how much fee they are willing to pay per coin for rebalancing the specific channel

Why Is It Technically Interesting?

General desired properties - tailored to unique PCN characteristics

Maximizing Social Welfare + Individual Rationality + Truthfulness

A property tailored to unique PCN characteristics:

Cyclic Budget Balance: for every individual rebalancing cycle zero-net flow

Impossible to achieve all 4 properties (from double auction impossibility)

Musketeer Solutions

Variant 1

- Users know in advance max/min fees (posted-price auction)
- Satisfies all, but it is a restricted setting

Variant 2

- VCG-type auction only for buyers
- Satisfies all, but does not treat sellers as strategic agents

Variant 3

- First-price auction considering both buyers and sellers
- Satisfies all, but truthfulness

Variant 4

- Double auction that leverages time delays
- Satisfies all, but users incur some cost in terms of execution delay


Limitations & Future Work

- Variable delay costs
 - Consider distinct levels of utility loss from delays
- Repeated games
 - Can users benefit from the repeated nature of rebalancing by e.g. underbidding?

Check the preprint version:



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